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DCI/IC-2526-77

NSC REVIEW  
COMPLETED,  
7/2/03.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy to the DCI for the  
Intelligence Community

FROM:

25X1A

SUBJECT: Comprehensive Test Ban Intelligence Working  
Group (CTBIWG) (U)

1. (S) As the result of an unexpected White House requirement involving the SCC Work Program for the CTB discussions, we find ourselves competing for the same manpower assets to work the DCI's tasks assigned to the CTBIWG.

2. (S) The wording in the final paragraph of the White House memorandum might be considered contentious in the sense that it appears to preempt the purposes set forth in the DCI's 23 June memorandum to NFIB members; it appears to place the NSC in a position of orchestrating internal Community management structure. The NSC Staff (Mr. John Marcum) has assured us this is not the case. Rather, Mr. Marcum states the SCC Working Group is expected to provide broad options/alternatives upon which the Community could make judgments concerning how it will manage CTB monitoring.

3. (U) Unless you want to make a reclama to the NSC Staff re who goes first, recommend we drop back.

25X1A

Attachment:  
Memorandum for Chairman, NFIB  
signature

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2 IMPDET CL BY

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IC 77-2526

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STATINTL

STATINTL DCI/IC/OPEI/PAID/ (8Aug77)

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Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83M00171R000500050006-2

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC-2528-77

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John N. McMahon  
Acting Deputy to the DCI for the  
Intelligence Community

SUBJECT: Comprehensive Test Ban Intelligence  
Working Group (CTBIWG) (U)

REFERENCE: a. Memo, White House, Subject: SCC Work  
Program for Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB)  
Discussions, 19 July 1977 (Tab A)  
b. Memo, Chairman, NFIB, Subject: Comprehensive  
Test Ban Verification, 23 June 1977, (Tab B)

1. (S) Action Requested: Sign the attached memorandum (Tab C) to the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) delaying the report required of the ad hoc interagency Comprehensive Test Ban Intelligence Working Group (CTBIWG).

2. (S) Background: In a memorandum to NFIB dated 23 June 1977 (Tab B) you established the CTBIWG and directed that it submit to NFIB a report on the tasks specified in that memorandum. The CTBIWG has completed some elements of its required tasks, but the report is contingent upon stated verification criteria which was to have been developed by ACDA. However, in a 19 July 1977 White House memorandum from David Aaron, the NSC Special Coordination Committee established a Work Program for CTB (Tab A) which encompasses the development of verification criteria options/alternatives and a proposed interagency management plan to ensure the effective utilization of all government resources in monitoring a CTB agreement; these aspects of the SCC requirements are being managed by ACDA. The IC Staff is closely monitoring the activities of the NSC/SCC Work Program for CTB.

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3. (U) Staff Position: Mr. John Marcum of NSC and Mr. Larry Finch of ACDA, both key figures in the SCC CTB Work Program, have reviewed the White House and IC Staff program requirements and agree that the purposes of your CTBIWG would be better served by waiting until the SCC report has been completed.

4. (S) Recommendation: The NSC/SCC Work Program for CTB Discussions is developing information essential to fulfilling requirements specified in your 23 June memorandum to NFIB. It is recommended that you sign the attached memorandum.

John N. McMahon

Attachment:

- Tab A - White House Memo on SCC  
Work Program for CTB Discussions
- Tab B - NFIB Memo on Comprehensive  
Test Ban Verification
- Tab C - Memorandum for signature


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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 19, 1977



MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO: The Director, Office of Science  
and Technology Policy  
The Director, Arms Control and  
Disarmament Agency  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of  
Staff  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
The Administrator, Energy Research  
and Development Administration

SUBJECT: SCC Work Program for Comprehensive Test  
Ban (CTB) Discussions

The SCC Working Group should continue its review of verification issues, taking into account developments in the ongoing trilateral CTB discussions, with the following specific tasks:

- By August 1, prepare an analysis of the incremental contribution of unmanned seismic stations to our national technical means, beginning with an analysis of the cost, location and contribution of one station or array, and including increasingly larger numbers of stations and arrays as appropriate.
- By August 1, prepare an analysis of the technical feasibility, utility, risks and costs of CTB evasion scenarios. This analysis should include an evaluation of the implications of the improved method for estimating the yield of nuclear explosions from seismic data.

At the request of the President, Frank Press will establish an ad hoc scientific group to review and evaluate the responses to the above tasks prior to their consideration by SCC.

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In addition, the SCC Working Group should:

- By August 15, prepare a safeguards plan concerning measures that could be taken under a CTB to adequately maintain our nuclear weapons design capability and the reliability of our stockpiled weapons, and to ensure readiness to resume nuclear weapons testing, if necessary. This should include an analysis of the facility and test site maintenance that would be required, and the types of experiments that might be conducted under a CTB.
- Sampling* -- By August 15, review our current and planned national technical means, including options for further improvements, and develop a proposed interagency management plan to ensure the effective utilization of all government resources in monitoring a CTB agreement.

  
David Aaron

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NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Attachment to NFIB-  
32.1/20  
23 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board  
FROM: Stansfield Turner  
Chairman  
SUBJECT: Comprehensive Test Ban Verification

1. The United States and the Soviet Union have begun preliminary discussions concerning the negotiation of a multilateral treaty to terminate nuclear testing, as proposed by the President. The significantly expanded dimension of this treaty, over that of the Limited Test Ban Treaty currently in effect, will increase the scope and complexity of the responsibilities assigned to the Director of Central Intelligence and bring into focus the issue of appropriate roles and missions within the Community.

2. In order to ensure that the Intelligence Community can assume these increased responsibilities, I have established an interagency CTB Intelligence Working Group, to be chaired by a member of the Intelligence Community Staff. Interested members are invited to designate to my Acting Deputy for the Intelligence Community (Point of Contact: ) a representative to this group. The first meeting of the Working Group will convene at the Community Headquarters Building on 23 June 1977.

3. I am directing that this Working Group prepare a report for the NFIB no later than 15 August 1977 on the following two tasks:

--Task 1: The CTB Intelligence Working Group is to examine in depth the appropriate roles and missions of the DCI and the Community agencies and organizations in the monitoring and verification of the proposed CTB. This examination should address the capabilities of and the interrelationship among Community elements as well as the

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interface of these elements with other government agencies and organizations, and should present issues and options for subsequent NFIB consideration.

--Task 2: The CTB Intelligence Working Group is to determine the requirements for intelligence in support of CTB verification, to identify the resulting intelligence collection, analysis, and reporting needs; to analyze current and planned intelligence capabilities in order to identify deficiencies; to address the relationship between CTB and nuclear proliferation intelligence activities; to recommend improvements in intelligence capabilities and procedures; and to propose options for the coordination or management of interagency CTB monitoring functions.

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STANSFIELD TURNER

(22 June 1977)

SECRET NOFORN



THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board

FROM : Stansfield Turner  
Chairman

SUBJECT : Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Verification (U)

1. (S) At the request of the President, the NSC Special Coordination Committee established on 19 July an ad hoc work program for CTB. Elements of this group's activities involving a management plan for monitoring a CTB are integral and precursor to the report requirement now under preparation by the CTB Intelligence Working Group (CTBIWG), as set forth in my 23 June memorandum, subject as above. As a result, the 15 August submission date set for the Community report to NFIB must be adjusted to conform to the schedule of the SCC working group which expects to complete its task in September.

2. (S) The Community CTB Intelligence Working Group, upon receipt of Presidential guidance expected to emanate from the SCC working group, will then continue its efforts as outlined in the tasking set forth in my 23 June memorandum. At that time, the CTBIWG will assess verification capabilities and fashion organizational structures and procedures to fit the options/alternatives developed by the NSC/SCC working group.

STANSFIELD TURNER

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DCI/IC-2526-77

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy to the DCI for the  
Intelligence Community

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[Redacted]

25X1A

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[Redacted]

25X1A

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Memorandum for Chairman, NFIB  
signature

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b. Memo, Chairman, NFIB, Subject: Comprehensive  
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*None - information*

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*[Handwritten signature]*

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*concur with the IC Staff judgment*

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- Tab B - NFIB Memo on Comprehensive Test Ban Verification
- Tab C - Memorandum for signature

*Accept a delay in completing the*

3.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board

FROM : Stansfield Turner  
Chairman

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